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Foreword
Markets require clear rules and supporting institutions to function properly. Millions of business deals are
made every day between complete strangers, and most of these transactions will not be repeated. If
individuals and businesses come to believe that contracts cannot be enforced, the cost of doing business will
rise for everyone. Cultural norms and social ties are effective means of controlling bad behaviour within small
communities, but they are not much help when markets operate beyond the boundaries of the village or small
town.
This paper reports results from a survey of 180 farmers and 47 traders in the Mekong Delta's pomelo fruit
market. The authors found that contract enforcement remains a serious problem in the fruit trade. Since
transactions are risky, costs are higher than they should be for both farmers and traders. The paper also
considers the appropriate policy response to this situation. The best solution would be to guarantee easy and
affordable access to a transparent and impartial legal system. But the authors are aware that legal system
development will take some time. In the meantime, the creation of feedback mechanisms that facilitate the
development of commercial reputations would represent a cost-effective alternative. 
UNDP Policy Dialogue Papers contribute to key policy debates in Viet Nam through the analysis of critical
development issues. Our aim is to stimulate informed discussion and debate through the presentation of
information and evidence collected and presented in a clear and accessible manner. 
While the ideas expressed in the paper do not necessarily reflect the official view of UNDP, we value the
opportunity to contribute to policy discussions in Viet Nam. We thank the research team for their thorough
investigation of this complex issue, and their constructive policy recommendations. We hope that this paper
stimulates further research in this area and healthy debate on alternative policies to accelerate agricultural
and rural development.
Setsuko Yamazaki
UNDP Country Director
Credit and Trust: Fruit Markets in the Mekong Delta
Vu Thanh Tu Anh and Brian JM Quinn
Abstract
The economic literature suggests that in markets where legal institutions are weak, such as Viet Nam,
parties will rely on private ordering to assure performance of complex transactions. This paper examines
fruit markets in the Mekong Delta. While transactions in this market could be simple (spot market
transactions), parties frequently make them more complex by adding a credit component. A survey of
180 farmers and 47 middlemen in the Mekong Delta's pomelo fruit market produces little evidence that
private ordering mechanisms are playing a substantial role in assuring contractual performance in
somewhat complex market transactions. As a result, in the absence of credible legal institutions and
effective private ordering mechanisms, there are significant transaction costs built into the pomelo
market.  This paper recommends the creation of a simple reputation mechanism, not unlike those now
employed in online auction markets, which, if implemented, can improve efficiencies in the market while
lowering risks for both farmers and middlemen.
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1Introduction
This paper presents findings and analysis from a survey examining the organization and structure of
transactions in the Mekong Delta's pomelo fruit market. Notably, the pomelo market has developed
notwithstanding an absence of both credible legal institutions and private ordering mechanisms to provide
assurance of contract performance.  Because buyers and sellers in this market do not, for the most part,
repeat transactions with each other, the market is subject to relatively high transaction costs associated with
potential opportunistic behavior by market participants. This paper recommends developing reputation
mechanisms to bolster the robustness of market interactions through increased access to information about
counterparties. In particular, by facilitating information about the past performance of market actors, a
reputation mechanism can create a virtual second period interaction between parties and, as a result,
constrain potential bad behavior. The result of creating this type of private ordering device for the pomelo
market should be a reduction in transaction costs, evidenced by better prices for farmers and increased trade
credit for middlemen. In Part 1, we describe the private ordering literature, and highlight the role of reputation
and market intermediaries in providing assurance of contract performance in market's lacking strong legal
institutions. In Part 2 we briefly describe Viet Nam's agricultural, economic and legal reform efforts in the past
several decades. In Part 3 we explore the organization and structure of transactions in the Mekong Delta's
pomelo market. In Part 4 we present findings and analysis from our survey of 180 pomelo farmers and 47
middlemen. Finally, in Part 5 we suggest several policies for improving the pomelo market's efficiency.   
1. Private Ordering
There is now a large and growing literature on private ordering. It is generally considered true that parties have
incentives to structure transactions so that to the degree possible, they are self-enforcing. Indeed, where legal
systems are not functional, private ordering mechanisms (bilateral relationships, communal norms, or market
intermediaries) are generally understood to be required to allow economic activity to occur on any significant
scale.1 This belief finds its basis in the applications of game theory.  Specifically, in the absence of efficient and
predictable legal institutions simple market transaction becomes a form of one-shot game. In a one shot game,
where neither party can expect a second period interaction, parties to the transaction have an incentive to
cheat.  Sellers have an incentive to sell goods or services at less than the advertised quality, and likewise
buyers have an incentive to avoid payment, if possible. As a consequence, market transactions, in these
circumstances, are limited to spot transactions where quality is apparent to the buyer. A strong legal system
creates a virtual second period relationship between otherwise anonymous buyers and sellers. With strong
legal rights, parties to transactions can sue for specific performance or damages if they are cheated by
counter-party in a transaction.  Strong legal rights and institutions allow market actors to bargain in the shadow
of law with anonymous counterparties at long distances with confidence that opportunistic behavior will be
punished.
In the absence of strong legal rights, parties are inhibited in the type and character of dealings they can
undertake. That is not to say, in the absence of strong legal rights that parties will not pursue market
transactions. They will, but they will likely be limited in scope and scale. In these circumstances, parties
gravitate toward private ordering mechanisms in which the incentive for continued cooperation is the prospect
of future business.2 Where the net present value of cooperation is greater than the net present value
associated with opportunistic behavior, parties will find ways to cooperate. Strong legal rights create
quasisecond period effects by ensuring that anonymous parties to a transaction have some post-contractual
remedy in one-off settings. In the absence of those rights, private ordering can offer similar protections. Two
basic approaches involve: first, long term, or relational, contracting between two parties; and second, the
development of reputation intermediaries, or trust services, in order to enforce second period penalties on
parties in one-off transactions.3
1 For a discussion of the role of private ordering in dysfunctional legal systems see McMillan and Woodruff, 2000.
2 Of course, this incentive is often present whether or not strong legal institutions exist.  
3 Among others see Baird, Gertner and Picker 2000; Dixit 2004; and Klein 2000.
2By converting the one-off, anonymous transaction into a series of repeated transactions between known
players, parties can create a powerful self-enforcing mechanism.4 The threat of withholding future business
can be a powerful incentive not to act opportunistically. Where relational contracting is not possible because
the market is fluid and relatively anonymous, parties can attempt to rely on proxies to send signals to
prospective counterparties about their fitness as a business partner.  These proxies act as signals and also
act as virtual second periods.  For example, one such relational proxy is reputation.5 A good reputation sends
signals to potential counterparties about one's willingness and ability to perform and at the same time, the
ability of a counterparty to negatively impact on that reputation, and hence the future income generating ability,
of the bad actor, creating a virtual second period.6
Alternatively, as suggested by Akerlof, parties can employ branding devices, franchising7 or "trust services"
(e.g. Underwriters Laboratories)as reputation proxies to convey otherwise private information and to generate
a second period mechanism to constrain opportunism. Trust services can convert a one-off transaction into a
multi-period transaction, and create information feed-back loops that act as a virtual second period in a spot
transaction. A trust service allows anonymous market participants to punish bad market actors through
withholding their business, thereby constraining opportunistic behavior. In certain settings, trust services can
develop spontaneously. In others, trust services require at least some level of third-party sponsorship in order
to get started.
2. Viet Nam in Transition
Viet Nam began its transition from central planning to a market economy in the mid-1980s and picked up
steam following the withdrawal of Soviet assistance in the late 1980s. The Doi Moi, or Renovation, era has
been characterized by increasing liberalization of the economic arena. By 1989, Viet Nam had substantially
freed up agricultural production by almost completely privatizing the agricultural sector (Lipworth and Spitaller
1993). This was followed by across the board price liberalizations and a devaluation of the exchange rate, as
well as a reduction in the subsidies to state enterprises (Leipziger 1992 and Le Dang Doanh et al 2002). By
1991, Viet Nam could be considered the foremost reforming transition economy in many important aspects.
During the 1990s and as a result of successful implementation of the reform programme, Viet Nam enjoyed a
period of rapid growth averaging between 8-9 percent per year (Dapice 2000). 
Agriculture has been one of the most important beneficiaries of Viet Nam's economic reform programme and
is an important part of the country's economic life. The economic liberalization of the late 1980's helped push
a massive expansion in rice output, allowing Viet Nam to move from a net rice importer in 1988 to the world's
third largest rice exporter in 1989. During the 1990s with the growth in the production of coffee, Viet Nam
became the second largest coffee exporter in the world, behind only Brazil.Notwithstanding the success of the
agricultural sector, Viet Nam remains a mostly poor, rural country with more than 73 percent of the population
in rural areas though just over 20 percent of the country's GDP is generated by the agricultural sector.
Together with the rapid changes in the economy and economic management during this period, Viet Nam
embarked on a legal reform agenda. Legal reform in Viet Nam can be characterized by the frenetic pace at
which the country's legislature has passed a host of legislation over the past two decades aimed at modernizing
the country's economic regulation. Notwithstanding the efforts that have gone into rebuilding a legal system
appropriate for a market economy, confidence in formal legal institutions in Viet Nam remains low.
Viet Nam's legal system remains burdensome and unwieldy. According to the World Bank a simple contractual
dispute requires an average of 295 days to be resolved by the courts. The cost of resolving such a dispute is
equivalent to 31 percent of the contract's value, thus making resort to courts ineffective as a business matter.8
Even if one were to get resolution through the courts, there is not much confidence in the result. According to
4 Adam Smith called this the "discipline of continuous dealings."  See Smith 2000.
5 See Smith 2000, Greit 1993 and Fafchamps 1996. 
6 Reputation markets are highly dependent on good flows of information.  If information is not readily available to market participants,
the value of reputation as both a signal and a relational proxy is weakened.
7 Akerlof 1970
8 The World Bank, DOING BUSINESS SURVEY available at http: //www.doingbusiness.org.
3a survey conducted by the UNDP, only 20 percent of respondents in rural areas stated that judgments of the
courts are "just and fair" (UNDP 2004). There is a clear perception that the formal legal system is corrupt and
unreliable; 74 percent of respondents indicated that the honesty of judges was important to the outcome a
formal legal proceeding, while only 65 percent thought having the law and facts on one's side was important.
The distrust of the formal system is shared by firms. According to a recent nation-wide survey of more than
6,000 firms conducted by the Viet Nam Chamber of Commerce and Industry (VCCI), 89 percent of firms
choose to negotiate, compromise, or let the conflict resolve itself as the first response when conflict emerges.
Less than one percent (0.8 percent) of firms in the survey seek court assistance; 1.6 percent of firms surveyed
rely on intervention by local government while 1.9 percent get help from relatives or friends to resolve the
conflict. Finally, only 0.05 percent of firms in the survey reported turning to business associations (like VCCI)
for help in resolving contractual disputes (VCCI 2006).
Given the weakness of the formal legal system in Viet Nam, one would not expect parties to rely on formal
legal rights when contracting. Formal written contracts in such an environment should have little value since
the cost of procuring enforcement is prohibitively expensive.  Rather, one would expect parties to adopt private
ordering strategies (e.g. relational contracting or trust services) in order to ensure contract performance. This
should be particularly true as the complexity of the transaction increases. Among other things, complex
transactions may involve delayed payment or delayed closing. 
3. The Study Area and Typical Transactions
3.1. Overview
The study was conducted in three districts: Binh Minh and Tra On (in Vinh Long Province) and Chau Thanh
(in Hau Giang Province). Vinh Long and Hau Giang lie in the center of fruit production in Viet Nam.  Located
just north of Can Tho, Viet Nam's fourth largest city, Binh Minh and Tra On districts of Vinh Long Province
have relied on fruit production for much of their income for many years.9 In 2005, 54.8 percent of Vinh Long's
provincial income came from agriculture and fisheries, including approximately 14 percent from the production
of varieties of fruit, including lychees, longans, rambutans, mangoes and pomelos. In 2005, an area of about
35,000 hectares in Vinh Long was reserved for growing a variety of fruits. The area for growing pomelos alone
was about 5,300 hectares. Pomelos account for about 15 percent of fruit production in the province. Binh Minh
District is known throughout the Mekong Delta for its Nam Roi pomelos where about 3,000 hectares are
devoted to production of this variety.10
Although Nam Roi pomelos were first grown in Binh Minh, the variety is now also grown in neighboring districts
and provinces.  For instance, Phu Huu Commune in Chau Thanh District, Hau Giang Province has grown Nam
Roi pomelos for a long time. Approximately 60 percent of the commune's total area of 2,000 hectares is used
for growing pomelo. Its pomelo output reached 84,300 tons last year and is expected to increase because of
the expansion of land devoted to pomelo.
9 Vinh Long Statistical Yearbook 2005.
10 Nam roi (five sticks) pomelos  receive their name from a local legend about a farmer who beat his children with five swats of a
stick if they brought him low quality fruit.  Today nam roi pomelos are known for their high quality.
4Map 1 :  Vinh Long Province 11
3.2. Typical Transaction 
The structure of the market for pomelos in the Mekong Delta is characterized by almost perfect competition.
A few thousand pomelo farmers own small gardens, averaging less than a hectare in area. These gardens are
typically located adjacent to canals and waterways making transportation by boat throughout the Mekong
Delta simple and cheap.  Rather than transport their produce to a market in an urban center, most farmers sell
their pomelos through middlemen who float the canals and river-ways of the delta. There are some three
hundred or so middlemen buying pomelos in the Mekong Delta. These middlemen move the crop to wholesale
floating markets elsewhere in the Mekong Delta and to larger markets in Ho Chi Minh City (approximately 135
km to the north.)
Given the weakness of Viet Nam's legal system, one might expect transactions between farmers and
middlemen to be structured as cash spot transactions between strangers. In the event that the market for
pomelos is subject to asymmetric information one might expect the development of relational contracting or
the active involvement of information (reputation) intermediaries in order to assure contract performance.
While there is some evidence of relational contracting, the majority of farmers and middlemen approach the
market as a series of one-off transactions with strangers.
3.3. Typical Farmer
Farmers engaged in growing fruit generally find it a profitable endeavor; 33 percent of farmers in the Mekong
Delta report growing fruit. For the most part, these farmers grow fruit for commercial purposes with more than
91 percent of the fruit harvest marketed for cash (IFPRI 2002 and Vasavakul 2006). A survey we conducted
in 2005 and 2006 with 180 pomelo farmers provides information about the typical pomelo farmer in Vinh Long
Province and her market transactions. Pomelo farmers in the survey group grow pomelos on a plot averaging
6,900 sq. m in size and report average annual revenues from pomelo sales in the range of VND 30 million (or
approximately USD 1,875) per year.  
11 Map Source: http://gis.chinhphu.vn/ShowmapGov.asp?pLayer=vinhlong_dis 
5Though distances in the Mekong Delta are small, many farmers are nevertheless relatively isolated. In 2001,
only 34.3 percent of villages had paved roads that could support automobile transportation to the village
center. Few farmers have access to market information; only two percent of 1,500 fruit and vegetables farmers
surveyed had a phone, and not a single farmer in the 2000 survey possessed an e-mail address (IFPRI 2002).
Few farmers have access to credit. A survey by the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MARD)
found that only 25 percent of farmers have access to any credit.12 In fruit production, few, if any, farmers report
receiving any credit from middlemen, fruit processors or farmers' associations.  
Farmers with boats have the ability to sell at least a portion of their fruit on the local markets, floating markets
in the Delta or to the wholesale markets in Ho Chi Minh City. However the large majority (80 percent) report
that they sell their fruit to the market through a middleman. 
Figure 1: Buyers of Fruit from Farmers
3.4. Typical Middleman
There are approximately 300 buyers who travel throughout the Mekong Delta buying pomelos from farmers
and transporting them to floating and regional markets in the Mekong Delta, markets in Ho Chi Minh City, or
to processors for export. A survey conducted by the authors in 2006 of 47 middlemen in Binh Minh, Tra On,
and Chau Thanh specializing in buying and selling pomelos provides information about the typical middleman
operating in Vinh Long and her market transactions. On average, these middlemen have been in the pomelo
business for almost 11 years.  
Barriers to entry and exit from the middleman business are relatively low, but are not insignificant. There are
no special licensing requirements for middlemen nor are there any formal trade associations or informal ethnic
associations that might limit participation in the market.13 There are, however, three significant barriers.  First,
middlemen face the expense of a boat. The average sized boat is 43 tons and can cost approximately three
to five thousand dollars.  Only 55 percent of surveyed middlemen report owning their own boat; the others rent
their boats.  
The second barrier to entry is access to credit. Middlemen typically spend anywhere from 10-15 days
collecting pomelos from farmers. During this period, they require capital to finance these transactions. Capital
requirements for middlemen can be substantial. The average middleman collects fourteen tons of fruit per
month.  Assuming and average price of approximately 3,000 VND per kilogram, the middleman must be able
12 IFPRI 2002. This survey was carried out on 1505 fruit and vegetable producers in October-November 2000 by the Ministry of
Agriculture and Rural Development (MARD) and the International Research Institute for Fruit and Vegetables (IRIFV). 
13 That is not to say that ethnic groupings never existed in Viet Nam. Prior to 1979, for example, trade in rice was commonly
understood to be monopolized by ethnic Chinese middlemen in the South. See Ungar 1988.
6to finance VND 42 million (USD 2,600) for up to a month while she collects and then markets her fruit.
Because most middlemen do business as sole proprietorships or without any business registration at all, they
lack the ability to fund their own capital requirements through credit lines from banks. The capital requirements
for middlemen get even more difficult for those who give credits to wholesalers. Interviews with wholesalers
in Tam Binh, which is the main pomelo wholesale market in Thu Duc District in Ho Chi Minh City, reveal that
the majority of wholesalers receive credits from middlemen, sometimes up to 100 percent.
The third barrier to entry is access to the trading network in regional and wholesale markets in Ho Chi Minh
City.  Informal interviews by the authors with middlemen in the three biggest floating markets in the Mekong
Delta, namely Cai Rang, Phong Dien, and Phung Hiep, reveal some of the middlemen cannot sell their
pomelos to Ho Chi Minh City markets because they lack reliable partners. It appears that this problem can be
solved with the passage of time.  The longer a middleman has been in the business, the more likely she is to
enjoy stable and mutually reliable relationships with several wholesalers in Tam Binh market.    
Middlemen tend to specialize (97.8 percent of respondents report buying and selling only a single variety of
pomelo). Many middlemen are also pomelo farmers themselves. As a result, they are very attuned to the
market and quality. The appearance of the skin and the weight of the fruit are the most important indicators of
quality that a middleman looks at. More than 95 percent of middlemen claim that they have a better sense of
quality of the fruit they are buying than the farmers selling it. Middlemen are unanimous in their opinion that
they have better market and price information than farmers. 
3.5. Typical Farmer-Middleman Transaction
In transactions between farmers and middlemen, middlemen in boats approach farmers and fruit gardens
along the ubiquitous canals of the Mekong Delta.14 Farmers normally do not harvest fruit until they have found
a buyer.  Pomelos can be left on the tree for some time without fear of the fruit going bad, but at the expenses
of the next years productivity. This allows farmers to entertain offers from a number of potential buyers and
wait for the best price. One might best characterize competition in this market as intense; 42 percent of buyers
receive more than six approaches by middlemen in any given season. Nearly 20 percent of farmers report
entertaining more than eleven middlemen approaches during a season. Only six percent of farmers receive
an average of one or no approaches from middlemen. Clearly, the market for fruit at the level of the farmer
and her garden is competitive. Farmers do not, as was the case in the past in rice production, face local
monopoly buyers for their produce.
Figure 2: Middlemen Approaches to Farmers
14 Many places in the Mekong Delta are still not accessible by car and can only be reached by foot, motorcycle or boat.
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7Farmers have at least three ways of selling their crop, each with a corresponding pricing method. Farmers
who sell their crop retail (mostly low-quality fruit) sell and price by the piece. Farmers can also sell their
gardens by the kilo. This method is sometimes used. The typical purchase arrangement requires the
middleman to buy a farmer's entire garden, not simply fruit of particular sizes or quality. One of the authors
observed a middleman buying a garden. The middleman and the farmer walked around the garden together
while the middleman quickly counted and evaluated the quality of fruit in the garden. They then agreed upon
a price for the whole garden and the payment terms. 
Payment terms and the middleman's obligations can differ. Typically, the middleman will leave a deposit (up
to 30 percent) and promise to return in several days, or even weeks before the farmer harvests the entire
garden under her observation. Generally, middlemen will make full payment when they collect the harvested
pomelos.  In some situations, where middlemen are unable to get access to working capital or when the
market price remains unknown to the middlemen, farmers will agree to defer receiving payment from
middlemen until after the middleman sells all of the fruit in the floating markets of the Mekong Delta or the
wholesale markets in Ho Chi Minh City. The result is that for a significant number of farmers, what might
otherwise be a cash spot transaction is transformed into a complex agreement with delayed performance by
the buyer.
Figure 3: Payment Terms
The delayed nature of the transaction gives rise to an incentive for parties on both sides of the transaction to
cheat. Farmers are providing credit to middlemen. Unless constrained by legal rights or other means,
middlemen have an incentive to simply not complete their payment once they have taken the fruit.  Absconding
is a serious default since it means that the farmer will bear a substantial loss. The lack of an ex post settling
up capability which strong legal rights or private ordering offer can create incentives for middlemen to
oppotunistically avoid making final payment.
Farmers, on the other hand, also face an incentive to cheat on their agreements with middlemen.  Since there
is an active local market for high quality fruit and the period between contracting and delivery can be lengthy,
farmers have an incentive to extract value from the fields before delivery to middlemen. During the harvesting,
farmers can set aside the best quality fruit (or even just the better than average quality fruit) in order to sell on
the local market. While a middleman might have assessed the general quality of the garden, it is likely that as
memory fades, farmers can get away with a "lemons" sale.  In addition, because of the delayed nature of the
transaction and the lack of written contracts (only about 10 percent of transactions use written contracts), one
can expect farmers to entertain subsequent higher offers from other sellers, resulting in hold-ups and
renegotiation between buyers and sellers. In the circumstances described above one might readily expect the
market for pomelos to collapse under the weight of potential opportunism (Akerlof 1970). However,
notwithstanding the potential for opportunism, the market continues to develop and grow.  How parties
structure their transactions to mitigate or constrain the risk of opportunism is a valid inquiry. In the absence of
strong legal rights one would expect that parties would gravitate towards long-term contracts with known
entities or to seek the assistance of reputation intermediaries to generate sustainable agreements. There is
little evidence, however, that this is happening in the Mekong Delta fruit gardens.
Spot/Cash
68%
Delayed
Payment
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83.6. Floating Markets
Floating markets are a well-known feature of Mekong Delta life. These wholesale markets are normally located
near cities and towns at the confluence of several rivers or canals.  Some of the best known floating markets
can be found at Cai Rang, Phong Dien, and Phung Hiep. But other smaller floating markets can be found
throughout the Delta. These markets are, for the most part, informal affairs, without  formal infrastructure.
Although some floating markets are operated adjacent to retail markets on land (Phong Dien) and or
wholesale markets (Cai Rang). The floating markets have no central management authority, nor do the
provincial market regulators who typically oversee the operations of markets on land have a presence in these
floating markets. That said, some market norms have developed with regard to product specialization.  Some
markets tend to offer more vegetables (Phung Hiep) while others tend to offer more fruit (Phong Dien).  
These markets are typically spot markets with very little or no credit involved. This implies that transactions in
this kind of market do not require either private ordering or legal rights. There is virtually no formal regulation
in the floating markets. Participation in the markets is open to any and all comers, although participants must
pay a small fee of several thousand VND.  For the most part, participants in the floating markets are farmers
or middlemen who come to sell their produce to other middlemen for resale in Ho Chi Minh City and other
regional markets. The buyers at the floating markets can also be sellers serving local retail markets.
Noticeably, export processors do not play any role in this market. The main reason is that the products for
export markets are highly selective and standardized; exporters normally go directly to individuals gardens to
select fruits meeting their customers' standards.  
3.7. Ho Chi Minh City Wholesale Market and Export Market
Tam Binh Market in Thu Duc District is where most pomelo wholesale transactions occur in Ho Chi Minh City.
In this market, middlemen sell pomelos to wholesalers who later sell on to retailers.There is no formal
regulation in this market. The market opens to about 100 wholesalers who have normally been in the business
for many years. Unlike floating markets, the wholesale market in Tam Binh is supported with much better
infrastructure. The typical wholesaler rents a small shop of 10 sq.m for about 4.5 million VND (approximately
USD 300.00) per month.  She is provided with electricity, security and cleaning services that cost her about
750,000 VND USD 50.00) which are not included in the shop leasing contract.  Every month, the wholesaler
is supposed to pay a fixed amount of tax of 300,000 VND (USD 20.00).
An important difference between floating markets and Tam Binh Market is that transactions in the latter very
much involve credit and private ordering. Typically, middlemen give credit to wholesalers, sometimes up to
100 percent, and come back to collect money only after the wholesalers have sold on to retailers. The
relational contracting between the middlemen and wholesalers is therefore very important to facilitate their
transactions. Our interviews with wholesalers in Tam Binh Market reveals that they deal with particular
middlemen for a long time, and the longer the wholesalers stay in business the more likely they are to stick
with regular partners.
Prices in the wholesale market are typically set by the middlemen. The middleman sometimes gives 100
percent credit to the wholesaler (who acts on behalf of the middleman for a commission), and the middleman
provides the wholesaler with reference prices for different pomelo qualities. However, it is unclear whether the
wholesaler is able to pocket the difference if the wholesaler sells pomelos at a price higher than the price
referenced by the middleman. 
94. Farmer and Middlemen Survey
4.1. Initial Observations
A survey of farmers and middlemen undertaken by the authors between 2005 and 2006 provides empirical
data regarding practices in the market for pomelos in the Mekong Delta. The survey of 180 farmers and 47
middlemen focuses on the structure of transactions between those two parties.  
Given the weakness of legal rights in Viet Nam, it should be no surprise that parties do not rely on formal legal
institutions to enforce agreements in the fruit market. More than 88 percent of farmers report that they do not
rely on written contracts with middlemen when selling their fruit. Similarly, 85 percent of middlemen report not
relying on written contracts when dealing with farmers. Few market participants appear willing to rely on formal
legal institutions to resolve potential disputes that might arise. 
Given the fact that the transactions between farmers and middlemen are complicated by the credit that the
former often gives to the latter, it is surprising to see how little farmers and middlemen in the pomelo market
rely on private ordering mechanisms in order to assure contract performance. In the authors' survey, 73
percent of farmers report selling to a different middleman for each of the previous three years.  Middlemen for
their part report that approximately 45 percent of the farmers from whom they buy were farmers from whom
the middlemen had not purchased before. These results are counterintuitive since all indications are that, given
the weakness of Viet Nam's formal legal structures, parties should rely on private ordering mechanisms.  However,
gravitation towards private ordering does not appear to be happening spontaneously in spite of the weakness of
legal rights. 
Figure 4: Farmer Transactions
This willingness to find a new business partner every year lowers the long-term value of each of these
relationships, and as a result lowers the deterrent value of not acting opportunistically.  More than 80 percent
report that they would switch from one middleman to another in order to get a higher price. Defection in order
to pursue a higher price is also the main type of contractual non-performance that middlemen report of
farmers.  Farmers report that they would be willing to move to a new middleman for a price increase of five to
ten percent. If a farmer were to switch buyers subsequent to meeting an agreement with an initial buyer, that
would likely lead to a dispute over performance obligations which implicates parties' legal rights.  Given the
informal nature of contracting the types of disputes and how parties resolve these disputes are informative.
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4.2. Disputes
Disputes between farmers and middlemen, are not unexpected, and indeed 45 percent of middlemen report
knowing about disputes in which a farmer broke an agreement with a middleman. Thirty-four percent of
middlemen report having had problems with farmers themselves in the performance of a contract.  Of the
middlemen who report having performance problems with farmers, half report that farmers cancelled contracts
in order to sell the contracted upon fruit to another buyer for a higher price.  
Table 1: Middlemen Problems with Farmers
Farmers also report having trouble with middlemen, though in smaller numbers. Only ten percent of farmers
report having had difficulties with middlemen in the previous five years. Of those, the biggest problem with
middlemen by far is their failure to make complete payment for fruit that they take. However, 31 percent of all
farmers in the survey report knowing someone who has been cheated by a middleman.  As a result, though
cheating by middlemen is not altogether common, it is not distant from the minds of many farmers.
Table 2: Farmer Problems with Middlemen
From both perspectives, middlemen and farmers face an ex post contracting risk. Middlemen risk farmers
defecting or demanding renegotiations for small price increases. Farmers, on the other hand, risk middlemen
taking fruit with a promise to complete payment at a later date and then absconding.  With strong legal rights,
these problems can be managed. In the absence of strong legal rights, one would expect to see gravitation
amongst market actors toward private ordering in order to constrain potential opportunism.
4.3. Managing Disputes
With regard to potential disputes, market actors react in a manner that one might expect: 89 percent of
middlemen would withhold future business from farmers who did not perform. Similarly, 95 percent of farmers
would withhold future business from middlemen who they believed might have cheated them.
However, it is not clear how effective this sanction is in constraining opportunism by market actors. Since few
farmers or middlemen appear to invest heavily in long-term relationships, these self-help sanctions may not
carry any punitive impact on bad actors.  In order for punitive retaliation of this sort to be an effective private
ordering sanction, parties to the transaction must have something to lose by ending a business relationship.
Without the prospect of future repeat business, there is little incentive for farmers or middlemen to constrain
their own behavior.  As a result, in an environment where one-off transactions are the norm, the threat of
withholding future business is not an effective private ordering strategy. On the other hand, parties learn.
Farmers in the survey who report having had trouble with middlemen in the past are more likely to engage in
repeat transactions.
Given that parties tend to engage in one-off transactions, it is surprising that few farmers seek outside help to
resolve disputes when they arise. Of those farmers who reported problems, 44 percent terminated their
Farmer sells to other buyer
Price problems (renegotiation) 
Poor quality fruit
Other 
50.0%
18.8%
18.8%
12.5%
Middleman failed to pay
Disagreements over quality
Pricing Problems
Other
43.4%
16.6%
11.1%
16.6%
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business relationship without resorting to any third party for assistance. The next most common response was
to attempt to negotiate a solution with the middleman without third party assistance.  Of those farmers who went
to third parties, only a very small minority of farmers went to the formal dispute system (i.e. courts) for resolution. 
Table 3: Dispute Resolution Methods (Farmers)
Middlemen appear to exhibit slightly different tendencies.  While the majority of them seek to either negotiate
or move on (58.2 percent), a larger proportion than among farmers seeks the intervention of some third party
to settle contract disputes. This result is likely a function of the type of dispute that parties will encounter.
Middlemen seeking performance of their contracts will likely be asking for specific performance or at least a
return of a lost deposit so that they do not suffer a direct financial loss as a result of the farmer not performing.
Farmers, on the other hand, are left holding a bill for an empty promise to pay. In such situations, the
middleman is long-since gone, unlikely to return.  In such a case, it is unlikely that a farmer will be able to track
down a middleman and seek payment given the time and expense likely to be involved in such a search.
Table 4: Dispute Resolution Methods (Middlemen)
Farmers live-and-let-live approach has an interesting analytic impacts on the way they do business and make
investments. Since farmers approach every transaction with the understanding that in the event of dispute
(e.g. middleman avoiding payment) they will have no recourse, their enterprises are less profitable than it
might otherwise be, leading to sub-optimal investment incentives. Analytically, the net present value of a
farmer's interaction with a buyer is less than the stated price of the contract because the farmer knows that
there is some probability that the middleman will renege on her agreement and seek to avoid payment. Since
the implied probability of successfully collecting damages from a middleman in a dispute is very low (given the
fact that almost half of farmers will not pursue resolution of a dispute), the present value for farmers of any
one transaction is very low. Lower expected profitability could cause farmers to make sub-optimal investments
in developing and/or maintaining their orchards.  In addition, because each of the interactions with middlemen
are low-payoff events, farmers do not have a strong incentive to invest in long-term relationships with
middlemen, making it profitable for farmers to cherry-pick fruit and cheat buyers.
4.4. Reputation Intermediaries and Trust Services
Reputation can be an important trust service. If a reputation is well-known, it can play the role of a 'virtual'
second period. Bad actors in one-off transactions who develop 'bad' reputations for dealing may find it hard
to find new business partners willing to do business with them. Large numbers of farmers report that they
would not do business with someone if they had heard that she had either not paid or had otherwise cheated
another farmer (90 and 92.2 percent, respectively). Middlemen appear to show a similar respect for the power
of a 'bad' reputation. Ninety percent of middlemen report that they would decline to buy fruit from farmers who
had a reputation for 'bad' dealing.
The operative problem for both farmers and middlemen, however, is getting access to information about
another's reputation. Reliable information about counter-parties' reputations does not exist, thus it is difficult
for "reputation" to play any role in constraining behavior.  More than three quarters of farmers report that they
do not do repeat business with middlemen.  For them, reputation turns out to be a relatively low priority. These
Forget it and move on
Negotiate with middleman
Go to court, local govt, police
Other
44.4%
27.8%
22.2%
5.6%
Forget it and move on
Negotiate with farmers
Go to police, court, local govt.
16.3%
41.9%
41.9%
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farmers report that price is the most important factor with 81.8 percent reporting that price is the primary
motivating factor for their decision to sell to a particular middleman; 54.9 percent of all farmers reported that
they were willing to sell to a stranger.
It appears that there are only limited sources of information about the reputations and trustworthiness of
potential business partners. Middlemen tend to be itinerant. They can range great distances in their buying
and selling activities. They drop in and out of the business and do not benefit from natural monopolies. There
are no administrative regulations that govern their practice, so there is no obvious signal to buyers other than
the presence of a large capital investment in the business (a boat), though that is often leased.15 Farmers
report that they consider themselves good judges of the character of a potential business partner (68.9
percent).  However, they appear to have very little direct information on which to reach such conclusions.  
While there are a number of formal associations for farmers, there are no associations presently acting as
reputation intermediaries. The Viet Nam Fruit Association, which is supposed to be the representative
association for fruit farmers and the fruit industry, is not present in 80 percent of the areas where pomelo
farmers operate.  As a result, less than 20 percent of farmers report being members.  Where it is present, it
does not appear to be set up to coordinate information sharing of the type that would be of use to farmers or
middlemen in assessing the quality of a potential trading partner. Certainly, farmers can get together informally
and share information. Or, farmers could access information regarding middlemen through one of the local
organizations. However, information gathered through local organizations and cooperatives has limited
deterrent effect since farmers sharing information in this way suffer from a geographic limitation that is not
shared by middlemen. 
Table 5: What information do you get from local organizations?
Informal reputation intermediaries in the Mekong Delta are hard to find.While rural communities are closeknit,
they lack many of the attributes that make it possible to create a private reputation intermediary. In Bernstein's
example of the diamond industry, the association controlled participation, and thus bad actors could be
excluded from the market (Bernstein 1992). In Landa's example of ethnic Chinese merchants, they were tied
together by common ethnicity and family ties (Landa 1999). In the Mekong Delta fruit markets, farmers and
middlemen do not necessarily share any attributes other than time and place.  Ethnic or family ties are not
significant.  Entry and exit into both the market to buy and sell fruit is low and not regulated. The fact that
middlemen are mobile and not confined to particular geographic areas lowers switching costs on both sides
of the transaction.  In the absence of a quasi-regulatory body, then, it is difficult for farmers to develop useful
information on potential counter-parties.
As a result, the effect of reputation and the role of a reputation intermediary on a seller's choice of buyer is
indeterminate. This is so because even though most farmers report that they will refuse to do business with a
"bad type" both farmers and middlemen report doing business with strangers.  Most farmers do not appear to
expect to remain in long-term relationships with middlemen anyway.  Farmers set themselves up for a series
of one-off transactions in a setting where information regarding the reputations of counter-parties is not very
good.  The threat that farmers might withhold future business from a bad counter-party is not credible because
most middlemen will expect farmers not to be repeat suppliers in any event. 
Farmers report that the most important reason for doing business, either as a repeat player or with a stranger,
is high price. There do not appear to be significant cultural, social or ethnic ties between parties that do
business together over time. Only about one quarter of farmers report doing business with the same
middleman every year. These farmers do not appear to have significant familial, social or ethnic ties to bind
the parties into a relationship with these middlemen.  When asked why farmers continue to do business with
Extension services
Credit
Market information
Dispute resolution
66.7%
9.5%
11.9%
11.9%
15 55.3 percent of middlemen do not own the boats that they use. 
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their middlemen of choice more than 50 percent responded that trust was the critical factor. While the
evidence of this trust is clear - farmers grant credit to middlemen with whom they have not done business
before, the source of this trust is not.
Middlemen appear to test the trustworthiness of new business partners. Middlemen report placing smaller
average orders with farmers with whom they have not done previous business. Middlemen report a substantial
difference in the size of the purchases in first time transactions than they do with repeated transactions. The
average size of purchases from initial sellers is only 35-40 percent of the average size of purchases from
repeat sellers. While it may be true that middlemen increase purchases in repeat transaction, the opposite
may also be true. The survey data is ambiguous on this point. Because middlemen tend to buy whole gardens
and not portions of gardens, it is just as likely that in response to an expectation of repeat business with a
trust-worthy buyer farmers make investments, expand production and increase the size of their gardens.
It is worth noting that there is no formal or informal association of middlemen. This implies that there is no
information transmission mechanism. Unlike some other markets, middlemen in the pomelo wholesale
markets do not have any "informal" association or, for instance, a popular coffee shop where they can swap
information. 
4.5. Credit as a Proxy for Trust
Where legal rights are weak, granting credit to counter-parties may signal a high degree of trust.16 In that
sense, the markets for fruit in the Mekong Delta appear to engender a relatively high degree of trust given the
weakness of legal rights. Thirty-two percent of farmers report agreeing to receive delayed payment for their
fruit. Taking delayed payment is the functional equivalent of granting credit to counter-party. In this case, nearly
30 percent of farmers report that they regularly grant credit to middlemen, generally people with whom they
have no previous business or social relationship. Trust develops very quickly - indeed perhaps too quickly to
be motivated by an economic rationale.
The form of contract used in the Mekong Delta is appropriate to the setting, informal.  Only about 10 percent
of farmers rely on written contracts. The vast majority of farmers rely on oral contracts (46.1 percent) or report
having no agreement at all with buyers (42.2 percent) (the functional equivalent to an oral contract).
Middlemen report a similar experience with 85 percent relying on oral contracts.  Oral contracts are interesting
because the delayed payment terms require a degree of trust in order to assure satisfactory completion.
Though farmers will deal with only one middleman at a time, middlemen deal with multiple farmers. This gives
rise to potential for disagreement as memories fade.
Figure 5: Types of Contracts
The time interval between delivery and final payment ranges from three days to three months. 
16 Woodruff and McMillan (1999) argue that where a party to a market transaction has high-switching costs, this may also motivate the
granting of credit.  
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Table 6: Middlemen Delayed Payment Terms
On the other hand, this credit relationship does not appear to be a two-way relationship. No middlemen in the
survey report offering credit to farmers. Consistent with that, a large majority (86.2 percent) of farmers report
receiving no credit from middlemen in the form of cash or extension services. This is consistent with an
understanding that farmers and middlemen do not invest in long-term relationships, since the business cycle
over which a farmer would require credit is much longer than that of a middleman.  Since middlemen have a
low expectation of doing repeat business with farmers, they have less incentive to provide farmers credit
during the off season.  
McMillan and Woodruff find a correlation between granting of credit and the degree of lock-in between
business partners. They conclude that high switching costs and not necessarily trust, are the motivating
factors for the granting of credit (Mc Millan and Woodruff 1999). Here, however, we do not find a correlation
between the lack of competition (or high switching costs) and willingness of farmers to grant credit.  More than
60 percent of middlemen report that the market to buy pomelos from farmers is moderately to very
competitive. Farmers report a similar story; 64.2 percent of farmers report being approached by more than five
middlemen every year, with 32.4 percent reporting being approached by between six and ten different
middlemen every year.  One would be correct to conclude that there is little "lock-in" in the pomelo market.
Buyers are not geographically limited and parties need not make asset specific investments in relationships
in order to enter the market.  
Table 7: Middlemen Approaches to Farmers
Farmers appear to be willing to grant credit to middlemen with little regard to the degree of competition for
their fruit. The proportion of farmers who report that they would allow a middleman to make delayed payments
does not appear to be correlated in any significant way to the amount of competition or lock-in faced by
farmers; 30-45 percent of farmers report that they would allow a middleman to make delayed payments.
The data provide an interesting fact about reliance on written versus oral contracts as it relates to the amount
of competition in the market. Farmers who report moderate to no competition for their fruit (0-2 approaches
per year), rely exclusively on oral contracts to document their sales to middlemen. Farmers who report
competitive or extremely competitive markets, on the other hand, are more likely to rely on written contracts;
44.4 percent of farmers entertaining offers from more than twenty middlemen per year report relying on written
contracts. This would lead one to conclude that middlemen facing competition for supply employ written
contracts to create visible legal rights. Given the data on disputes and dispute resolution, it is not clear how
strong the legal rights created by these written contracts are in the end.
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4.6. Trust Puzzle
The presence of a high degree of trust in these complex transactions is puzzling. The fruit market is highly
competitive with relatively low switching costs.  As a result, one would expect to see the development of spot
transactions between different buyers and sellers.  However, almost one third of sellers report granting credit
to buyers, most of these buyers represent new relationships. Given the large amounts of a farmer's annual
income represented by the extension of credit, it is puzzling that a farmer would readily place it at risk in order
to accommodate one of any number of potential buyers.  If buyers require credit, one would expect sellers to
gravitate toward long-term relationships with particular buyers in an attempt to constrain potential opportunistic
behavior by middlemen. While this is occurring in isolated cases, it does not appear to occurring
systematically. This result is also puzzling.
The trust that farmers exhibit is also surprisingly robust.  Of those who reported having trouble with buyers in
the past five years, two-thirds report that they would still do business with strangers.  Indeed, the group of
farmers with the best knowledge of how a stranger might act opportunistically is more willing to do business
with strangers than others. Only 44 percent of those who have not had any trouble in the past five years report
that they would do business with strangers (this in spite of the fact that the vast majority report doing business
with a new middleman every year).  While trust appears to be strong even for those who have been cheated
in the past, there are limits. Of those who know someone who has been cheated in the past, 57.1 percent use
written contracts, compared to only 12 percent overall. The effectiveness of such contracts is suspect,
however. A significant minority of those who have been cheated in the past (20.9 percent) have established
long-term contracting relationships with middlemen.  
5. Policy Implications of the Study
The policy implications of this study are not altogether obvious at first glance. The issues raised by the
interactions of farmers and middlemen do not rise to the level of market failure. Farmers must enter the market
to sell and are not likely to stop because buyers have an incentive to act opportunistically.  The interactions
between farmers and middlemen do, however, indicate that significant transaction costs are present in this
otherwise competitive market.  Reducing those costs can improve the efficiency of the market and have a
positive impact on household income for farmers by reducing risk while improving access to trade credit for
middlemen.
In the first instance, it is clear that improving the efficiency and the accessibility of the Vietnamese judicial
system should continue to be an important priority for Viet Namese policymakers. If parties had reasonable
access to the judicial system, contracts, both written and oral, would be significantly bolstered and there would
be a commensurate reduction in transaction costs. Viet Nam and the international community have had an
active programme in legal and judicial reform for at least the past decade. The focus has been on drafting
legislation, training judges and improving the overall efficiency of the judicial system.  Achieving the goal of an
efficient and accessible judiciary, however, is a difficult and expensive long-term proposition.  Work in that area
is by no means done.  
Without duplicating or supplanting the judicial assistance programs going on elsewhere, there are discrete
ways that one can improve the efficiency of spontaneous markets, thereby reducing transaction costs for
market participants. In the case of the pomelo market where parties engage in one-off transactions, the market
would benefit from the addition of a feedback mechanism to create virtual second periods for transactions. An
efficient judicial system does this by creating legal rights to second period enforcement of promises made
between strangers. In other circumstances, ethnic, cultural or social ties can create second period
opportunities that promote norms of behavior in order to constrain bad behavior by market actors.  
A feedback mechanism in the Mekong Delta would not have the benefit of either strong social ties or cultural
norms. Nevertheless, one could build on local institutions to create a feedback mechanism that would facilitate
the development of commercial reputations by actors in the fruit market.  Information can be a powerful device
in facilitating trade between strangers.  A feedback mechanism could be as simple as a voluntary reporting
system where parties who have had disputes with either middlemen or farmers could post their experiences.
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Such a mechanism might be similar to the feedback/reputation devices presently employed on Internet
auction and seller sites, like eBay and Amazon. In those markets, information about past performance of
anonymous counter-parties is used as a virtual second period in order to constrain potential opportunistic
behavior and facilitate trade between strangers.
Developing a reputation mechanism for fruit markets in the Mekong Delta need not be technically advanced
or complicated. Its function would not be to supplant formal institutions, nor would it require the active
intervention of formal institutions or third parties. A feedback mechanism could take advantage of market
forces to encourage parties, both farmers and sellers, to improve their contract performance.  It would do this
by creating an opportunity for farmers and middlemen to participate in a virtual second period with otherwise
anonymous counter-parties - evaluating the trustworthiness of recent counter-parties and sharing that
information with others in the marketplace across the Mekong Delta. For example, in the United States a
publication called Consumer Reports provides consumers with information about durable goods and services.
This publication is useful for consumers because they will typically have little information about the quality of
these kinds of goods and services since they are rarely in the market for them.  A seller who receives a good
rating for quality and service from Consumer Reports can expect to generate more sales.
Participants in the pomelo market, through a feedback system - either web or paper-based, could generate
reputations.  Bad actors who received negative feedback would, over time, find market actors moving away
from them.  A reputation mechanism works not only to punish bad actors, but it also rewards good players.
Generating a valuable reputation is difficult now given the high degree of competition and the cost of
information gathering about potential counter-parties.  
With a reputation mechanism in place, parties may find it relatively inexpensive to develop reputations for fair
dealing that are widely known. Good traders will create value for themselves by credibly signaling to the
market their reputation for fair dealing.  Middlemen will be willing to pay more to farmers who have a reputation
for always providing high quality produce and performing on contracts.  Farmers might be willing to take less
from (or provide more credit to) a middleman who is known for not absconding on promises to pay. By
providing parties an avenue for punishing bad actors, a reputation mechanism limits risk and creates
incentives for parties to provide better quality at lower prices.  
A second order effect of a reputation mechanism is that it would provide farmers and middlemen with better
pricing information. Farmers presently get all of their pricing information from middlemen. A reputation
mechanism would allow farmers and middlemen to better know the prices for pomelos in all parts of the
Mekong Delta and thereby improve the efficiency of the market.  A web-based mechanism which could provide
pricing information in close to real-time might be more valuable to farmers than a paper-based system that
might have a substantial production lag.
A reputation mechanism does not entail the creation of additional licensing or regulation which is neither
necessary nor feasible. It is simply a way to improve market efficiency through the development of market
mechanisms and the power of information. This approach should strengthen existing market structures and
support improving the efficiency of the market without imposing undue costs and burdens on market
participants. The approach taken to facilitate information flows need not be high-tech, indeed some of the most
effective of these mechanisms can be decidedly low-tech.17
The VFA or the Southern Fruit Research Institute (SFRI), in conjunction with local agriculture committees, is
probably the most appropriate body to create a reputation mechanism. However, in order to develop a
reputation mechanism, VFA (or the SFRI) will likely have to reorient some of its activities and find ways to
extend its reach. Unlike provincial governments it has broad enough scope to cover transactions throughout
the Mekong Delta. Unlike the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, these institutions are focused
enough on issues related to fruit markets and the Mekong Delta that they could reasonably be expected to
place a high priority on the effort. Local agriculture committees can help VFA extend its reach to the commune
level. 
17 For example, publishing the names and pictures of non-violent criminals is one typical way of creating an informal community sanction
through shaming. 
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However, there are a number of challenges related to the design of such a proposed mechanism.  First, a
reputation mechanism requires a large-scale data collection effort.  Neither the VFA nor the SFRI have the
strong representation at the village or commune level in the Mekong Delta that would be required in order to
collect transaction and reputation data, but collection of data could be overseen by local agriculture
committees.  
Assembling and sharing data in a low-cost manner is another challenge. This might be overcome through
technology.  A simple web-based application combined with collaboration from local agriculture committees at
the village level could be sufficient to start. Of course, penetration of technology at the village level is still
rudimentary and a web-based approach might be infeasible for the moment.  
In the alternative, a bi-monthly newsletter with information collected by the VFA or the SFRI, could be
circulated with information about unsuccessful transactions and with pricing information.  Such a publication
could be replaced at the appropriate time with a web-based approach.  
Policy Options18
Policy Option One: Web-based Reputation Mechanism
Objective:  Improve efficiency and lower risk of fruit markets by facilitating information 
flows regarding market actors.
Local Partners: VFA, SFRI, local agriculture committees
Detail: Web-based application can assemble information from transactions around 
the Mekong Delta providing farmers and middlemen with real-time (or near 
real-time) information on prices and feedback on dealings with middlemen and
farmers.
Policy Option Two: Newsletter Reputation Mechanism
Objective: Improve efficiency and lower risk of fruit markets by facilitating information 
flows regarding market actors.
Local Partners: VFA, SFRI, local agriculture committees
Detail:  Paper-based newsletter can assemble and provide basic information on 
unsuccessful transactions between buyers and sellers.
18 To keep our discussions focused, we have purposefully limited ourselves on policy recommendations related directly to the creation of
reputation mechanisms that help farmers and middlemen reduce their transaction costs. In practice, however, it is important for the policy
makers to be informed by other policy approaches. One such approach could be to build institutions that facilitate the dispute settlement
and contract enforcement (e.g., by improving the capacity of the local courts, by organizing farmers and/or middlemen into associations,
or by facilitating the emergence of key actors in the commodity chain such as Hoang Gia Fruit and Vegetable Processing and Export
Company.) Another approach could be to improve the current system of market information that can provide relevant market information
(i.e., price, quality, address of sellers and buyers etc.) in a timely and precise manner. This information system will benefit from the
cooperation among the farmer and middleman associations, the local and regional agriculture extension services, the research institutes
(such as SFRI and IPSARD), and  international technical support.
18
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